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A Descriptive Model to Analyze Asymmetric Multilateral Negotiations
Majid Sheikhmohammady, Kaveh Madani
Abstract
In multi-lateral negotiations, parties can use their power (political, military, economic,
etc.) to affect the final outcome of the game. In these games which are usually
asymmetric, due to uneven powers of the negotiators, players seek reaching their most
preferable outcome for which they can gain support from the other players. Conventional
conflict resolution methods do not consider the power of negotiators as an element of the
analysis. Here, we propose a method for studying multilateral asymmetric negotiations.
This method considers the power of the negotiator as a determining factor in finding the
final resolution. The proposed method is applied to find the most likely outcome of an
international water conflict which has remained unresolved since 1993. In this game, five
costal countries have been negotiating over the legal status of Caspian Sea without
reaching any success, resulting in tragedy of the commons. The results of this study are
compared with those of other studies on Caspian Sea conflict where the powers of
decision makers have not been taken into account in the analysis.
Introduction
Kersten (2002) defines negotiation as “a process of social interaction and communication
that involves the distribution and redistribution of power, resources, and commitments”.
Although there are many approaches to the theory and practice of negotiation, they all
fall into one of the only two fundamental categories: 1) Positional negotiation, also called
contentious or competitive negotiation; and 2) Integrative negotiation, also known as
cooperative problem solving or group decision making. Positional negotiation is often
referred to as hard bargaining, while integrative negotiation is soft. Hard bargaining
focuses on winning, avoids compromise, may include hidden agendas, and may result in
one-sided agreements. In contrast, soft bargaining is adaptable, focuses on finding
win/win solutions, encourages compromise, and sometimes creates innovative solutions
(Fisher et al., 1991). This research falls generally within the first category, but seeks to
integrate ideas from both.
One common classification of models is as normative (prescriptive), and descriptive.
However, this categorization is not exclusive, and one cannot necessarily ascribe a given
model or methodology to only one category. The method which we propose here is
mostly descriptive. The main objective of this method is to identify the most likely
outcomes of a particular form of multilateral negotiation, based on the capabilities of the
decision makers and their preferences over the known available alternatives. The
negotiation problems modeled and analyzed by this method are distinctive because the set
of possible agreements is discrete and pre-specified. Each decision maker has two
concerns: first, achieving an alternative which is as preferred as possible; and second,
building support among the other decision makers for this alternative. This method only
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requires each decision maker’s preference ordering of the alternatives, and does not
require cardinal measures of preference. Generally, this method is applicable to
multilateral negotiations with the following characteristics:
1) Decision makers in the negotiation look for a feasible resolution, in other words, a
stable or enduring agreement. Apparently, each negotiator tries to attain his/her most
preferable agreement.
2) If an agreement is reached, it must be an alternative from a pre-specified list,
which all decision makers must accept.
3) Decision makers can possess different levels of capability (power or legitimacy)
in support of an agreement, so the negotiation is not necessarily symmetric.
Proposed Definitions and Method
We now propose new definitions to identify the likely agreements and specify their
likelihoods. Suppose that N ={1,2,3,...,n} is the set of all decision makers (DMs) in the
negotiation, and A={a1,a2 ,...,aq } is the set of all alternative agreements. We assume n ≥ 2
and q ≥ 2 .
Definition 1: DMs’ Preference Rankings over Agreements
For i ∈ N , fi is DM i’s weak preference relation on A. Thus, ak fi a j means i prefers
%

%

ak to a j or is indifferent between ak and a j . The relation fi is assumed to be reflexive
%

and complete. Strict preference for DM i is the relation fi , defined on A by
iff ak fi a j and ¬ (a j fi ak ) , where ¬ means negation. For
%

%

i∈N ,

i

ak fi a j

is DM i’s

and a j fi ak . Preferences are usually
%
transitive but not always, and the methodology developed herein can be used even
when preferences are intransitive. We define Pi (a j ) = 1 + {a ∈ A : a fi a j } to indicate the
indifference relation on A; a j

i

ak iff ak

f a
%i j

preference of DM i over the alternative a j . For example P2 ( B) = 1 means that
alternative

B

is the best alternative according to DM 2. Likewise,
P3 ( A) = P3 ( D ) = 4 indicates that DM 3 is indifferent between alternatives A and D and
considers these alternatives as his or her fourth preference.
Definition 2: Acceptability
Each DM may be willing to accept only some of the proposed alternatives as the
outcome of the negotiation. For each DM, acceptability is denoted by a positive
integer. DM i will accept alternative a j iff Pi (a j ) ≤ Acci .
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Definition 3: State
A negotiation state consists of an alternative and a non-empty subset of DMs who
support that alternative as the outcome of the negotiation. Thus, (a j ,C) denotes a
negotiation state where a j ∈ A and C ⊆ N , C ≠ ∅ . The set of all states is
S = A × (2 N − ∅ ) . Note that S = q.(2 n − 1) .
Definition 4: Feasibility
An agreement can be implemented iff the supporting coalition is strong enough.
Hence, a negotiation state is feasible if the coalition defined by the state is strong
enough to enforce the agreement defined by the state. To reflect the different power
or legitimacy of DMs in real-world negotiations, we denote wi , the weight of DM i in
the negotiation. If the sum of coalition members’ weights is at least equal to the
threshold, T, then the negotiation state is feasible. T is the minimum strength (total
weight) of a coalition to enforce an agreement and must be determined before state
feasibility can be assessed.
and for each a j ∈ A a threshold
T (a j ) > 0 is determined. A negotiation state (a j , C) is feasible iff ∑ wi ≥ T ( a j ). If we

In summary, a weight wi > 0 is assigned to each

i∈N

i∈C

simplify this further by assuming
iff

∑ wi ≥T
i∈C

T (a1 ) = T (a2 ) = ... = T (aq ) = T

, then (a j , C) is feasible

.

Definition 5: Stability
A negotiation state from which there is no movement is called stable. Different types
of movements are defined in later sections.
Definition 6: Fallback Distance (FD)
is a non-negative integer parameter describing DM i. DM i is willing to make an
strategic disimprovement and accept ak rather than a j , even though ak p i a j , if
FDi

Pi ( ak ) − Pi ( a j ) ≤ FDi

.

The proposed methodology is based on the analysis of stable states. To determine the
stable states, we must describe the different possible movements (the likelihood of
occurrence of different moves is not the same). Members of the coalition of a negotiation
state might move to another state for the following reasons:
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1. Preferential Improvement: The members of the coalition find a more preffered
alternative.
2. Agglomeration: One or more extra DMs join the coalition because they support
the agreement that the coalition is enforcing.
3. Disloyalty: One or more members of a coalition may form another coalition (on
their own or along with other DMs) to support another agreement.
4. Strategic Disimprovement: One or more members of a coalition may join another
coalition supporting an agreement that is less peffered. This strategic
disimprovement must be a move from an infeasible state to a feasible one.
Caspian Sea Conflict
The Caspian Sea, the largest lake on the earth, has been the subject of one of the world’s
most intractable disputes, involving five littoral states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran,
Russia, and Turkmenistan since the collapse of the Union of the Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) in 1991. Before this time, the Caspian Sea was shared by Iran and the
USSR and two countries were enjoying a stable relationship based on two mutual treaties
of 1921 and 1941. Currently, there are five states bordering the Caspian Sea and there is a
dispute over who owns which part of the Caspian Sea, or whether the five littoral states
share the entire sea in some sense. The main motivation of the five states is the existence
of immense amounts of petroleum in the seabed. Since 1992, the five littoral states have
met on 26 occasions, at the presidential, ministerial and expert levels, in all five states
and in many different cities. The last presidential negotiating meeting was held in
October 2007 in Tehran. The lack of resolution has resulted in tragedy of the commons
where petroleum production is increasing pollution and overfishing is contributing to the
environmental degradation of this valuable natural resource. (Sheikhmohammady and
Madani, 2008a)
Sheikhmohammady and Madani (2008a, 2008b) provided more details about the Caspian
Sea conflict. Based on their discussion, five alternatives are available to resolve the legal
status of the Caspian Sea, denoted as follows:
C: Condominium
Dm: Division based on the International Law applying to Seas
De: Equal Division (20 percent of the sea, and the seabed goes to each littoral state)
Ds: Division based on Soviet maps
DC: Division of the seabed based on International Law, and condominium on the surface
Based on assessments of the countries’ national economic, political and military interests,
and on their public statements, it is possible to infer that each state has strict preferences
over the five alternatives. The states’ preferences are as follows (where “>” means
“strictly prefers”):
Azerbaijan: Ds > Dm > DC > De > C
Iran: C > De > Dm > DC > Ds
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Kazakhstan: Ds > Dm > DC > C > De
Russia: C > DC > Ds > Dm > De
Turkmenistan: De > Ds > Dm > DC > C
It is important to note that “Equal Division” does not result in equal shares in the
revenue. Each state would receive 20 percent of the total surface (and seabed) of the
Caspian Sea, located adjacent to its shores. Since oil and gas resources are not uniformly
distributed across the sea, the distribution of resources among states would be unequal. In
contrast, the condominium alternative proposes that each state simply receive an equal
share of the total revenue from joint exploitation of the resources.
Decision Makers’ Weights in the Caspian Sea Negotiations
The most challenging step in modeling the Caspian Sea negotiations based on the
proposed methodology is estimation of the DMs’ weights. In cases such as the Caspian
Sea conflict estimation of the DM’s weights is not as straightforward as cases such as the
decision mechanism of the Security Council of the United Nations or the voting system
of the European Union. In these examples, DMs’ weights reflect their level of legitimacy
in the voting system and modeling is easier than cased in which the weights of the DMs
are not clearly stipulated. DMs’ weights in the Caspian Sea conflict must be determined
based on their capabilities in the negotiation process.
The powers of the DMs must be estimated quantitatively by the analyst. In these cases,
the fundamental issue is the notion of power itself: What enables one party to gain
something from another patty in a negotiation? Power is a basic concept in both physics
and political science. To the physicist, power has a precise definition, nevertheless, to the
political scientist, it is vague. It is hard to go very deep into an analysis of negotiations
without invoking the concept of power. The natural science definition of power faces
many conceptual problems when it is imported into the social sciences. In physics, power
is defined simply as work done divided by the time taken to accomplish it. Time has a
standard measurement and work is defined by the force, which is required to move an
object, and the distance. Since the early 1930s, social scientists have had a good working
definition of power as the ability of one party to move another party in an intended
direction. However, there are two main difficulties in measurement of power. First,
resources come in many shapes and sizes, making it difficult to aggregate them within a
single measure. Second, resources sometimes come shapelessly, for instance in
leadership or moral rights, obligations, or commitments. Therefore, it is very difficult to
measure precisely the power of DMs in negotiations.
In the negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the weights of the decision
makers are not pre-specified. We proceed to estimate the power of the countries involved
in these negotiations by applying a Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) model.
It should be emphasised that this is only an estimation and that precise measurement of
the nations’ powers is not possible because some criteria like diplomatic efforts or
negotiators’ tactical skills are not quantified and therefore, cannot be easily measured.
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Table 1 lists all criteria that are considered to be important determinants of countries’
capabilities in the Caspian Sea negotiations. For each criterion, associated indicators are
also given.
Table 1. Criteria and associated indicators applied to estimate the weights of the
negotiators involved in the Caspian Sea Conflict
Criteria
Economic Independence
and Self-Sufficiency

Indicators
GNI/capita
Net trade / GDP
GDP/ Claimed Caspian Sea Oil and Natural Gas
Annual Military Expenditures
Military Expenditures/ GDP
Active Troops/ Population
Nuclear Power Status

Military Status of the
Country

US Financial Support
US Political Support
The Territory of Political Influence
Democracy Level

US Support
Political Influence and
Structure

To evaluate the weights of the decision makers in the negotiations over the Caspian Sea,
the importance of each criterion should be determined. The Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA) method can be applied to find the most favourable set of relative importance of
different criteria for each country. We use the DEA method to combine indicator values
to obtain weights for the countries. DEA is an increasingly popular management decision
tool initially proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). It is a linear programming based
technique originally designed to measure the relative performance of a number of
producers or decision making units, where the presence of multiple inputs and outputs
makes comparisons difficult. During the last decades, a significant amount of research
has focused on DEA for both theoretical extensions and practical applications. Cook and
Kress (1994) discussed relationships between DEA and MCDA and proposed a DEAbased MCDA method to handle both cardinal and ordinal criteria. Based on the DEA
concept, the weight of a criterion for a specific country could be different from the weight
of that criterion for another country. The comparison is conducted in a fair manner by
permitting each country to maximize its possibility of obtaining the best aggregate
evaluation result.
Different parameters Caspian Sea negotiations model are shown in Table 2. The numbers
in the weight column of this Table are the results of applying a MCDM model using the
DEA method. Acceptability and Fallback Distance of the five Caspian Sea states were
calculated by using definitions 2 and 6 based on the historical background of the conflict.
Table 2. Negotiation parameters
Country
Azerbaijan
Iran
Kazakhstan

Weight
4.91
4.55
4.48

Acceptability
2
1
2

6

Fallback Distance
1
1
1

Russia
Turkmenistan

9.98
3.26

1
3

1
1

In the Caspian Sea negotiations, there are five decision makers and five alternatives, so
the number of the negotiation states is 5 × (25 − 1) = 155 . We know that some bilateral
treaties or multilateral agreements among some of the five states have already occurred
since the collapse of the USSR. But these agreements may not endure, because the five
presidents of the Caspian Sea states agreed, in their joint declaration at the end of the
Tehran meeting in October 2007 that the legal regime of the Caspian Sea should be
determined unanimously.
Results
We applied the proposed methodology to predict the most likely outcomes of the Caspian
Sea negotiations. Since the five Caspian Sea states have agreed that the legal regime of
the Caspian Sea should be determined unanimously, it is reasonable that the threshold of
all alternatives is set at T= 27. In this case, only unanimous agreements over the five
alternatives are feasible. There are 38 stable states, however, only the five unanimous
agreements are feasible. Results indicate that among the five unanimous agreements,
state ( Dm , { A, I , K , R, T }) is the most likely enduring legal status of the Caspian Sea, and
( Ds , { A, I , K , R , T }) is second most likely. In other words, unanimous agreement over the
division of the Caspian Sea based on International Law applying to Seas is the most
likely state that might evolve as the ultimate outcome of the negotiations. Under this
division method, also known as “sectoral division”, full maritime boundaries of the five
countries would be established based on the median lines from the shores of the littoral
states, using the principle of equidistance to divide the sea and the undersea resources
into national sectors” (Sheikhmohammady and Madani, 2008a).
Discussion
Table 3 shows the predicted outcome of Caspian Sea negotiations based on different
methods which have been applied to this case. The previous studies on Caspian Sea
conflict had applied normative methods for predicting the outcome and therefore, their
results are different from the mostly descriptive method which was used. The normative
methods used before had ignored the powers of negotiators in this conflict while the
proposed method addresses the powers of the parties in negotiations. The majority of
previously applied methods had found Ds (division based on the Soviet Maps) as the final
resolution of this conflict while Dm was found to be the final outcome of the negotiations
when the parties use their powers to change the outcome to increase their gain. If
negotiators use their power (which is always true for cases like the example studied here),
the final outcome might not necessarily be socially optimal (as suggested by Social
Choice rules), belong to the compromise set of the problems in which negotiators have
equal powers (Fallback Bargaining Procedures), be the state which is stable under
different solution concepts for static games (found by Graph Model for Conflict
Resolution (GMCR)).
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Table 3. Predicted outcome of Caspian Sea negotiations based on different methods
Method

Rule

Result

Concept

Proposed Method

----------

Dm

Predicted Outcome

Condorcet Choice

Ds

Borda Scoring

Ds

Social Choice Rules

Plurality Rule

Ds or C

(Sheikhmohammady and
Madani, 2008a)

Majoritarian Compromise (MC)

Ds

Median Voting Rule (MVR)

Ds

Condorcet’s Practical Method
(CPM)

Ds

Unanimity Fallback Bargaining
(UFB)

DC or Dm

3-Approval Fallback
Bargaining (3-Approval FB)

Ds or Dm

Fallback Bargaining
Procedures
(Sheikhmohammady and
Madani, 2008a)

Graph Model for
Conflict Resolution
(GMCR)

Socially Optimal
Alternative

Compromise Set
4-Approval Fallback
Bargaining (4-Approval FB)

Ds

Fallback Bargaining with
Impasse

No
Agreement

----------

De

Equilibrium

(Sheikhmohammady el al.,
2006)

Conclusions
A new methodology was applied to identify the most likely outcome of the continuing
negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, considering the powers of the
conflict parties. We found division based on International Law applying to Seas as the
ultimate legal status of the Caspian Sea. Comparison of the result of this study with
previous studies on this conflict shows that normative methods predict a different
outcome for this conflict. However, those methods do not consider the powers of
negotiators in the conflict and therefore, their results might not well reflect the reality of
this conflict.
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